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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO SATELLITE SYSTEMS: 
 
A satellite is an object that orbits around another object. For example, the Moon is a 
satellite of the Earth, and the Earth is a satellite of the Sun. A rocket or cargo bay of the 
space shuttle is used to carry the satellite into orbit. Many emerging applications will 
incorporate multiple spacecraft that form communications networks necessary to achieve 
coverage, latency and throughput requirements.  
 
Satellite systems have the advantage of global coverage and inherent broadcast capability 
and offer a solution for providing broadband access to end users. Today, satellite 
technology is all around to bring us live coverage of events from around the world. 
Satellite networks play an important role in achieving global coverage by providing 
commercial, civil and military services. Many applications use satellite networks for data 
delivery. Worldwide communication using internet, telephone, television and radio ride 
on the presence of backbone satellites. Present day satellite networks enable people to 
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transmit data from/to any part of the globe instantaneously. Compared to geostationary 
(GEO) satellites, low earth orbit and medium earth orbit satellite networks have shorter 
round trip delays and lower transmission power requirements. They can also be used to 
carry signaling and network management traffic as well as data packets. 
 
The two most important elements of satellite networks are the satellites and the Earth 
stations. Generally, data packets will be transmitted from Earth stations to satellites and 
vice versa.  
1. Satellites - A satellite is an object that orbits around another object like earth. 
Satellites carry equipments like antennas, cameras, radar and transponders. 
Satellite payload represents all equipment needed to do its job. Communications 
satellites equipped with antennas and transponders receive the original signal 
from the transmitting Earth station and re-transmit this signal to the receive 
stations on Earth. The omni directional antennas that were used in communication 
satellites were replaced by unidirectional, pointed antennas. Researches concluded 
unidirectional antennas pointing quite precisely towards the destination 
outperform omni directional antennas. A weather satellite has cameras included in 
its payload. The payload for satellites depends on the operations they perform. 
Inter-satellite links enable inter-satellite communication, while satellite-earth links 
are used for message exchange with Earth stations. Satellites have processing 
capabilities and buffers to store information for transmission. Satellites also have 
rechargeable batteries to supply power when it goes out of the Sun’s scope. 
2. Earth Station – An Earth Station is located on the Earth's surface and is not 
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mobile. Earth stations transmit or receive data using a relay back bone of satellite 
networks. Earth stations like satellites have antennas, usually a dish, and are 
equipped with transmitters, decoders and receivers. In general, the earth stations 
have high power antennas which enable large coverage distance. The type and 
size of the antennas used varies with the type of services provided. Earth stations 
are sink nodes or destinations, for a sensor satellite network. The Application 
devices of the Earth stations transform radio signals received into information and 
transfer them to a computer or to a destined device, like a TV if it is a broadcast 
program. Similarly, this device will transform information to be transmitted into a 
signal that is suitable for transmission via the antenna, using modulation, 
amplification and other processing techniques. 
 
A Satellite network, composed of mobile satellites, fixed ground stations and 
communication links, have characteristics such as: long propagation delays, limited 
energy and time varying relatively high channel error rates. 
a) Mobility - Satellites are mobile and their mobility can be pre-computed 
using Keplerian laws, as they rotate in their orbits. Geostationary satellites 
move relative to earth and are always stationary above a point on the earth. 
Satellite mobility balances the resource utilization among the satellites, 
Long Propagation Delay - Satellites communicate using inter-satellite 
links and use satellite-ground links to communicate with earth stations. 
Satellites are usually far from one another and from the ground resulting in 
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long propagation delays. Propagation delay for deep-space communication 
links is variable and extremely long. 
 
Satellite networks are advantageous over terrestrial networks, as they are less affected by 
congestion; their architecture is scalable and also has coverage at geographical locations 
where it is hard to have a terrestrial network. Satellite TV, like Direct TV, which is a 
satellite based application can serve any individual, irrespective of how far is he from the 
nearest cable TV junction with digital quality television programming. In a country like 
Japan these services will fit best as it is practically not feasible to lay cable through all its 
islands. 
 
1.2 PROBLEMS IN EXISTING MODELS: 
 
Little work has been reported on space based security systems.  The main thrust of space 
communications to-date has been to provide secure communications between ground 
mission control and a single spacecraft.  However, with the proliferation of spacecrafts 
and instruments, the potential for malicious attacks has significantly increased. The 
security working group of Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has 
published a number of green books as recommendations for security protocols at the 
different communication layers [8,9]. In addition CCSDS has proposed security 
architectures for space communications as well as identified potential threats [8,9]. 
However, currently there is no key management infrastructure for space communications. 
 5 
Existing terrestrial key management structures are not suited for space due to the high 
latency and error rates. Key management schemes used previously are used only for 
general networks and are not suitable for wireless networks due to limited computational 
abilities of nodes. Predistribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to 
large amount of memory used when the network size is large. Furthermore, secure 
communications during spacecraft emergencies has received a very little attention to-
date.    
 
Networking protocols developed so far for mobile ad hoc networks may not be suitable 
for inter-space networks [1]. These protocols have been developed primarily for scenarios 
involving links without long propagation delays and for networks where node mobility 
cannot be pre-determined. While the former prevents the applicability of any such 
protocol for inter-space networks, the latter does not allow a protocol to take advantage 
of the predictable mobility patterns found in inter-space networks. Further, the existing 
protocols also may not incorporate the constraints necessitated by the limited energy-
supplies and intermittent connectivity between the orbiters. This further diminishes the 
applicability of the existing protocols for the given problem scenario. While some 
protocols have been developed for space-based networks [1], such protocols do not 
incorporate feedback from the physical layer and hence may result in sub-optimal 
performance. 
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1.3 PROPOSED WORK: 
 
Our main objective is to develop an algorithm that can increase the connectivity and 
security in the path while minimizing overheads such as complex computations, 
increased end to end delay, etc. 
In section 1.2, we have identified certain problems found in existing schemes. 
Problem 1) Node compromise is a serious treat to wireless networks deployed in 
unattended and hostile environments.  
Problem 2) Key management schemes used previously are used only for general 
networks and are not suitable for wireless networks due to limited computational abilities 
of nodes. Predistribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to large 
amount of memory used when the network size is large.  
 
In this thesis we investigate the above problems. The proposed algorithm tries to secure 
the communications between two nodes by using a two-tiered key management scheme 
based on location based key management and bloom’s scheme. The location based 
scheme generates a new common or shared key between two nodes or satellites, without 
the nodes having to exchange the keys themselves. The only information that is 
exchanged is the location of the nodes and their IDs, Hence, a malicious node that may be 
eavesdropping or intercepting the communications will not be able to obtain the shared 
key. Furthermore, only nodes which satisfy certain location constraints are able to 
generate a shared key. Thus a rogue node which does not satisfy location constraints is 
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not able to generate a shared key. This approach is particularly attractive in space 
networks since the location of a node is predictable. Hence if the location reported by a 
node does not match the expected location constraints, a shared key is not generated. 
However, since authentication is based only on location and ID, a malicious node may be 
able to generate the shared key because it is within the required proximity. We use 
Bloom’s scheme to ensure that such nodes, although authenticated, cannot generate a 
pairwise key which is needed for communicating with nodes.  
 
Bloom’s scheme is a fast technique for generating a pairwise key between nodes. This 
key can be used for encrypting messages, thereby providing secure communications. We 
used Bloom’s as a second level of security in our approach. The location based scheme 
outlined above serves to authenticate a node. Our assumption here is that ID and location 
are sufficient to authenticate a node. However, it is possible that a malicious node may be 
able to authenticate itself based on proximity. Bloom’s scheme uses the shared keys 
generated by the location scheme to generate a pairwise key which is used for 
communications. This may involve communications with the earth station (only if 
insufficient memory is available at the node). Bloom’s scheme prevents a malicious node 
which may be able to authenticate itself, but it will not be able to generate a pairwise key. 
In our approach the shared key is needed to generate the pairwise key, hence making our 
proposed approach more secure. 
 
A second approach is to obtain a secure communication between two nodes. In This 
approach we use the base topology graph derived from Location based graph and security 
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graph derived from Bloom’s scheme. The proposed scheme helps us in deriving a 
network graph, which is the edge wise intersection of base topology graph and security 
graph. The resulting Network graph has the property that two nodes can be connected 
only if they are within a range and share a common key. 
 
The proposed key distribution scheme outlined in the previous paragraph works because 
the nodes are assumed to be within a certain range of each other. In our case, we call this 
range r0, which is the communication range of a node. We next analyze the probability 
that if nodes lay within an area or range share a common key between them. A low 
probability indicates that a node has a low chance of being within the range r0, and any 
node that reports to being with this range is therefore likely not to be malicious. On the 
other hand, a high probability indicates that many nodes may be within range and this 
increases the chances that there may be malicious nodes within the range. In order to 
make sure there are no malicious nodes in the network we use the key distribution 
algorithm to check whether if two nodes within range share a common key between 
them. If they do not share then one of the nodes is considered to be malicious.  
 
In the proposed algorithm, every satellite is considered to be a node.  The satellite that is 
close to the earth station is called the root satellite and the one near the destination is 
termed as the terminal node. Adjacent satellites can communicate with each other and 
share keys to enable secure communication without much overhead. Unlike mobile 
networks, once the connection is established, they tend to exist unless the satellites move 
away from each other which will be for a definite period of time. The movement of a 
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satellite is pre-determined and hence proposed algorithm supports this system.  
 
In chapter II we review the literature in the field, Chapter 3 discusses in detail the 
proposed approach chapter IV analyses our simulation results and finally chapter V 
concludes the thesis with the main findings and work to be done in the future.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In this section we review previous work in the field.  We first review the popular 
communication protocols – TCP and UDP. This discussion is followed by a security 
routing protocol in sensor networks namely Location based authentication which 
provides perfect network resilience. 
 
In 1945, Arthur C. Clarke first predicted that satellites in orbit approximately 36,000 
kilometers above the equator, with a period of 24 hours, could maintain a fixed location 
as seen from the ground. In this geostationary orbit (GSO), a satellite could receive 
signals from the ground and transmit them over roughly a third of the Earth’s surface. For 
more than three decades now, GSO satellites have been virtually the exclusive means of 
providing space-based communications (e.g., TV broadcast, long distance telephone, etc).  
 
Satellite networking, using inter-satellite links, is essential to have continuous access to 
any part of the globe achieving global coverage and to carryout real time data 
transmission. A communication satellite is one used to receive and transmit data from and 
to any part of the globe, while sensor satellites like weather satellites are used to monitor  
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and forecast weather conditions. Satellite sensor networks have sensors to sense the 
environment of our interest and transmit it to the ground stations. In general, space 
networks can be classified based on the operations they perform and here are the satellite 
network types. [2] 
 
2.1 IPSEC (IP SECURITY)[4]: 
 
 Protocols operate at the network layer, layer 3 of the OSI model. Other Internet security 
protocols in widespread use, such as SSL and TLS, operate from the transport layer up 
(OSI layers 4 - 7). This makes IPsec more flexible, as it can be used for protecting both 
TCP- and UDP-based protocols, but increases its complexity and processing overhead, as 
it cannot rely on TCP (OSI layer 4) to manage reliability and fragmentation. 
There are two modes of IPsec operation: Transport mode and Tunnel mode. 
 
In Transport mode only the payload (message) of the IP packet is encrypted. It is fully 
routable since the IP header is sent as plain text; however, it cannot cross NAT interfaces, 
as this will invalidate its hash value. Transport mode is used for host-to-host 
communications. A means to encapsulate IPsec messages for NAT traversal have been 
defined by UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets. 
 
In Tunnel mode, the entire IP packet is encrypted. It must then be encapsulated into a 
new IP packet for routing to work. Tunnel mode is used for network-to-network 
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communications (secure tunnels between routers) or host-to-network and host-to-host 
communications over the Internet. 
 
2.2 TCP [4]:  
 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a virtual circuit protocol that is one of the 
core protocols of the Internet protocol suite, often simply referred to as TCP/IP. Using 
TCP, applications on networked hosts can create connections to one another, over which 
they can exchange streams of data using Stream Sockets. The protocol guarantees reliable 
and in-order delivery of data from sender to receiver. TCP also distinguishes data for 
multiple connections by concurrent applications (e.g., Web server and e-mail server) 
running on the same host. 
 
TCP does not perform well on satellite channels due to high delay bandwidth, high bit 
error rate and burst errors and thus increases work load on Transport and data link layer 
for retransmission.  
 
2.3 UDP [4]:  
 
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is one of the core protocols of the Internet protocol 
suite. Using UDP, programs on network computers can send short messages sometimes 
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known as data grams (using Datagram Socket) to one another. UDP is sometimes called 
the Universal Datagram Protocol. 
 
UDP does not provide the reliability and ordering while TCP does. Data grams may 
arrive out of order, appear duplicated, or go missing without notice. Without the overhead 
of checking if every packet actually arrived, UDP is faster and more efficient for many 
lightweight or time-sensitive purposes. Also, its stateless nature is useful for servers that 
answer small queries from huge number of clients. Compared to TCP, UDP is required 
for broadcast (send to all on local network) and multicast (send to all subscribers). 
 
2. 4 SCPS (SPACE COMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOL STANDARDS) [9]:  
 
SCPS is a protocol suite designed allows communication over challenging environments. 
Originally developed jointly by NASA and DoD’s USSPACECOM to meet their various 
needs and requirements. These protocols have been found to be applicable in meeting the 
needs of the satellite and wireless communities.  
  
SCPS, a completely open and proven technology, has met the needs of commercial, 
educational, and military environments. It was designed to meet the following goals: 
 
1. Best possible use of limited bandwidth 
2. High link utilization 
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3. Conservation of power 
4. Prioritization of traffic 
5. Tolerant of intermittent connectivity 
6. High forward/return link asymmetry 
 
2.5 LOCATION BASED AUTHENTICATION[7]: 
 
We use location based authentication in our approach as each satellite resents a potential 
point of compromise. Once compromising certain nodes and acquiring keying material, 
adversaries can launch various insider attacks such as they can spoof, alter or replay 
routing information to interrupt network routing, may launch Sybil attack where a single 
node presents multiple identities to other nodes, or launch identity replication attack, etc. 
This situation poses demand for compromise tolerant security design. That is the network 
should remain highly secure even when a number of nodes are compromised. Moreover, 
this scheme enables deterministic, secure and efficient establishment of a shared key 
between any two network nodes be there immediate neighbors or multiple hops away. 
 
Node compromise is a serious threat to wireless sensor networks deployed in unattended 
and hostile environments. [7] To mitigate the impact of compromised nodes, we propose 
a suite of location based compromise tolerant security mechanisms. This is based on a 
new cryptographic concept called pairing and by binding private keys of individual nodes 
to both their vicinity.  
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2.5.1 PRE-DEPLOYMENT PHASE: 
 
Assumption: All nodes have the same transmission range R and communicate via bi 
directional wireless links. Nodes perform a collaborative monitoring of the designated 
sensor field and report the sensed events to the distant sink, which is the data collection 
center with sufficiently powerful processing capabilities and resources.  
 
Let p, q be two large primes and E / Fp indicate an elliptic curve y2=x3+ax+b over the 
final field Fp. We denote by G1 a q-order sub group of additive group of points by E / Fp 
and by G2 a q-order subgroup of the multiplicative group of finite field F *p2 
Tasks before network deployment: 
a) Generate the pairing parameters, (p, q, E/F p, G1, G2, ệ) and select an arbitrary 
generator W of G1. 
b) Choose two cryptographic hash functions: H, mapping strings to nonzero 
elements in G1, and h, mapping arbitrary inputs to fixed-length outputs, e.g., 
SHA-1 [7]. 
c) Pick a random k € Z q as the network master secret and set Wpub = kW. 
d) Calculate for each node A an ID-based key (IBK for short), IKA = k H(IDA) € G1 
 
Each node is preloaded with the public system parameters (p, q, E / Fp, G1, G2, e, H, h, W, 
W pub) and its private IKA. It is important to note that it is computationally infeasible to 
deduce from k either (W, W pub) or any (ID, IBK) pair like (ID, IKA), due to the difficulty 
of solving the DLP (Discrete Logarithmic Problem) in G1. Therefore, even after 
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compromising an arbitrary number of nodes and their IBKs (Identity based key), 
adversaries are still unable to calculate the IBKs of non compromised nodes 
 
 
2.5.2 SENSOR DEPLOYMENT AND LOCALIZATION: 
 
1. After the pre-deployment phase, the nodes are deployed in various ways - physical 
installation or random aerial scattering.  
2. The nodes are localized using either of two localization techniques namely Range 
based localization and Range free localization. 
 
 a. RANGE BASED LOCALIZATION: 
 
 A group of mobile robots are dispatched across the whole sensor field along pre planned 
routes which have powerful computation and communication capabilities than ordinary 
nodes.  
 
The robot is equipped with master secret key. In order to localize a node: 
  i. The mobile robot runs the secure range-based localization protocol mentioned in 
references to measure their respective distance to node A and the co-determine the 
location of A. 
  ii. Then it computes hash function based on its location, master secret key and its id 
and sends information to A. Here, encrypting message with master key refers to 
message integrity code (MIC) of message. 
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  iii. Upon receipt of message, node A first uses its pre-loaded keying material to 
decrypt its location id and then re generates MIC. If both match, then it saves the 
location id for subsequent use. During subsequent network operations, node 
addition may be necessary to maintain good network connectivity which will be 
done in similar fashion. 
  
b. RANGE FREE LOCALIZATION:  
 
In this kind of localization technique, there are some special nodes called anchors 
knowing their own locations. All other non-anchor nodes derive their locations based on 
information from anchors and neighboring nodes via secure range-free localization 
techniques mentioned in references. 
 
 The nodes are pre-loaded with master secret key, which is used to derive their locations 
based on information from anchors and neighbors via secure range-free localization with 
assumption of secure-sensitive environment that the adversary takes time interval t which 
is more than the time taken to localize node and generation of location based id. 
 
2.5.3 LOCATION BASED NEIGHBORHOOD AUTHENTICATION: 
 
During the post deployment phase, each node is required to discover and perform mutual 
authentication with neighboring nodes. Each node will think of another node as an 
authentic neighbor if and only if that node is within its transmission range R and also 
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holds the corresponding LBK (Location Based Key). Suppose node A wishes to discover 
and authenticate neighboring nodes after obtaining its location and its LBK: 
 
I) Node A broadcasts an authentication request including its ID IDA and 
location l A and some random nonce n A.  
II) Upon receipt of such a request, node B first needs to verify the claimed 
distance using Euclidian’s distance (||l A - l B ||<= R) so that adversaries 
cannot surreptitiously tunnel authentication messages between B and some 
virtual non-neighbor node. If the inequality holds then B simply discards 
the authentication request. Otherwise, it continues with step III.  
III) It computes a shared key based as follows  
K B, A = ệ (LK B, H (IDA || l A)). It then unicasts a reply to node A 
including its ID and location, a random nonce nB, and MIC computed as h 
K B, A (n A|| n B || 1)  
IV)  Upon receiving the reply, node A also first checks if the inequality              
||l A - l B ||<= R holds. If so, it proceeds to derive a shared key as  
K A, B = ệ (LK A, H (IDB || l B)) whereby to re-compute the MIC. If the 
result is equal to what B sent, node A considers B as authentic neighbor. 
Subsequently, A returns to node B a new MIC computed as  
h K A, B (n A|| n B || 2).  
V)  Upon receipt of it, B uses K B, A to regenerate the MIC and compares the 
result with what it just received. If they are equal, B regards node A as an 
authentic neighbor as well. 
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The above process is valid because, if and only if both A and B have a correct LBK, KA,B  
is equal to K B, A due to the following equations: 
 KA, B = ê (LKA, H (IDB || lB)) 
           = ê (k H (IDA || lA), H (IDB || lB)) 
           = ê (H (IDA || lA), k H (IDB || lB)) 
              = ê (k H (IDB || lB), H (IDA || lA)) 
               = ê (LKB, H (IDA || lA)) 
           = KB, A  
In case multiple nodes simultaneously respond to the same authentication request, MAC 
layer mechanisms like random jitter delay (every node has to wait before answering an 
authentication request) are used to resolve this problem. 
 
 
2.6 BLOOM’S SCHEME: 
 
The key sharing scheme model allows any pair of nodes in a network to share a pair wise 
secret key as long as no more then λ nodes are compromised.  
 
Let (λ + 1) x N be a matrix over a finite field GF(q), where N is the size of the network 
and q > N. Matrix G is a public information and is shared by all nodes in the network . 
During key generation phase the base station creates a random (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) 
symmetric matrix D over GH(q) and computes an N x (λ + 1) matrix X = (D.G)T  where 
(D.G)T is the transpose of D.G. Matrix D must be kept secret and should not be disclosed 
to others.  
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Let K = X.G and Kij = Kji where Kij is the element in the ith row and jth column of K as we 
use Kij or Kji are the pairwise key between node i and node j. For k = 1,2,...N 
- store the kth row of matrix X at node k  
- store the kth column of matrix G and node k 
When nodes i and j need to communicate they exchange their columns of G and the 
compute Kij or Kji. Using private rows of X. as G is public information.  
 
 
2.7 PROBABILITY THEORY:[13][14][15][16] 
 
 
Probability Theory is concerned with modeling phenomena whose nature involves 
elements of uncertainty. Probability Theory deals with models of experiments whose 
outcomes cannot be precisely predicted. Tossing a coin, the duration of the uninterrupted 
operation of a machine, the proportion of defective articles in a large batch of items and 
more fall into the category of phenomena which can be studied by means of probabilistic 
methods.   
 
Probability has become very powerful mathematical tool in understanding those aspects 
of the world that cannot be described by deterministic laws. The central objects of 
probability theory are random variables, stochastic processes and events. Probability 
theory is important in the social sciences because it gives a theoretical background for 
both sampling and data analysis. The correct application of statistical methods and the 
interpretation of results also require familiarity with the most important concepts and 
results of probability theory.  
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2.7.1 PROBABILITY SPACE: 
 
Let Ω be a set and A is a collection of subsets of Ω. A is called a σ algebra on Ω if 
• Ø  Є A 
• For any A Є A, the complement Ω \ A Є A 
• Whenever A1, A2,….,An Є A then also A1U A2 U….U An Є A 
Assume now that A is σ algebra and A function  
P : A  [0,1] is called a measure if  
• P(Ω) = 1 
• If a A1, A2,….,An Є A are disjoint then P (A1U A2 U….U An ) = P(A1 ) + 
P(A2)….P(An ) 
• P(Ω\A) = 1 – P(A) for all A Є A. 
 
A probability space is triple (Ω, A, P) where Ω is a set, A is a σ algebra on Ω and P is a 
measure on A. 
 
2.7.2 RANDOM VARIABLE: 
 
A random variable on a probability space (Ω, A, P) with density function f is a map such 
that X: Ω   
DISCRETE RANDOM VARIABLE: 
 Let X be a random variable such that X: Ω  . The function p(x) given by p(x) = P(X = 
x), x Є D. is the probability distribution of X. it is also known as probability mass 
function. 
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Suppose a random variable X takes k different values, with the probability that X= xi 
defined to be P(X = xi) = pi. The probabilities pi must satisfy the following:  
1: 0 < pi < 1 for each i  
2: p1 + p2 + ... + pk = 1. 
 
CONTINUOUS RANDOM VARIABLE: 
 
Let X be a random variable X: Ω  that takes values in a uncountable set Ω , which is 
all or part of the real line .  
 
The random variable X is said to be continous with density f(x) for all a ≤ b, 
Such that X-1([a,b]) Є A and P( X Є [a,b] ) = P(X-1([a,b])) = a∫b f(x) dx 
The probability density f(x) is called the probability density function (p.d.f) where f (x) 
has the following properties of densities.  
1) f(x) ≥ 0 
2) 
-∞∫
∞
 f (x) dx =1 
 
 
2.7.3 UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION: 
 
Uniform Distribution is the simplest continuous distribution in probability. It has constant 
probability density on an interval (a, b) and zero probability density elsewhere. The 
distribution is specified by two parameters: the end points a and b. We denote the 
distribution U(a , b). Probability density function (PDF) is given by 
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2.7.4 POISSON DISTRIBUTION: 
 
The Poisson Distribution is a discrete distribution which takes on the values X = 0, 1, 2, 
3, ... . It is often used as a model for the number of events in a specific time period. 
 
f (k ;λ ) = (λk e- λ )/ k!  
Where e is the base of natural algorithm, k is the number of occurances of an event, k! is 
the probability of an event and λ the average number of events for given interval. 
 
2.8 GRAPH THEORY:[17] 
 
Graph theory is a study of graphs. A graph G = (V,E) consists of two sets, a finite set V 
of elements called vertices and a finite set E of elements called edges. If each edge has 
unordered pair of vertices, G is called undirected graph and if the edges of a graph G has 
ordered pairs of vertices, then G is called a directed or an oriented graph. We use v1, v2, 
v3…vn to represent the vertices and e1, e2,e3,..em to represent edges.  
 
PATH: 
A path is a sequence of vertices from V1 to Vu such that there is an edge to the next 
vertex in the sequence i.e., (Vi, Vj) Є E. 
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2.8.1 INTERSECTION OF TWO GRAPHS: 
 
Consider two graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2). The intersection of G1 and G2 
denoted as G1 ∩ G2, is the graph G3 = (V1 ∩ V2 ,E1 ∩ E2), the vertex set G3 consists of 
only those vertices present in both G1 and G2, and the edge set of G3 consists of only 
those edges present in both G1 and G2. 
 
 CONNECTEDNESS OF A GRAPH:  
 
Two vertices vi and vj are said to be connected in a graph G if there exists a path from vi 
to vj in G. A vertex is connected to itself. A graph G is connected if there exists a path 
between every pair of vertices in G. In a connected graph any two longest paths have a 
common vertex.  
 
NODE DEGREE: 
The degree of a node u is denoted as d(u), is the number of neighbors of node u, i.e., its 
number of links. A node degree d = 0 is isolated, i.e., it has no neighbors. The minimum 
node degree of a graph G is denoted as  
       dmin (G) =       {d(u)} 
Average n ode degree of G is  
       dmean (G) = 
n
1
∑
=
n
u
ud
1
)(  
 
 
 25 
K- CONNECTIVITY:  
 
A graph is k–connected if and only if no set of (k − 1) nodes exists whose removal would 
disconnect the graph. In other words, if (k − 1) nodes fail, the graph is guaranteed to be 
still connected. 
 
MATRICES OF A GRAPH: 
 
INCIDENCE MATRIX: 
 
Consider a graph G with n vertices and m edges. The incidence matrix A = [aij] of G has 
n rows and m columns. The element aij of A is defined 
 
G is undirected  
 
 
ADJACENCY MATRIX: 
 
Let G = (V, E) be a directed graph with no parallel edges. Let V = {v1, v2, ….vn}. The 
adjacency matrix M = [mij] of G is n x n matrix with mij defines as 
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REACHABILITY MATRIX: 
 
Let D = (V,A) be a digraph, where V = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The adjacency matrix of the 
digraph D is an n x n matrix A, where aij the entry on the i-th row and j-th column, is 
defined by 
 
 
The reachability matrix of the digraph D is an n x n matrix R where rij , the entry on the 
ith row and jth column, is defined by 
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION: 
 
Our main objective is to develop an algorithm that can increase the connectivity and 
security in the path while minimizing overheads such as complex computations, 
increased end to end delay, etc. 
Problem 1) Node compromise is a serious threat to wireless networks deployed in 
unattended and hostile environments.  
Problem 2) Key management schemes used previously are used only for general 
networks and are not suitable for wireless networks due to limited computational abilities 
of nodes. Predistribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to large 
amount of memory used when the network size is large.  
To solve the above two main objectives we have four sub problems to be solved 
 
Section 3.3: To use the fusion of Location based algorithm [7] and Bloom’s scheme [10] 
to derive a model for secure communication  
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Section 3.4: Simulation model to analyze k- connectivity of a network.  
 
Section 3.5: Probability to find a model where two nodes are within a range r0 and they 
both share a common key.  
 
Section 3.6: Security graph [10] and Base topology graph [7] are to be combined to form 
a Network Graph. To analyze whether the network graph has the properties 
of both security graph and base topology graph. 
 
3.2 CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
3.2.1 CONSTRAINTS: 
 
1. There is maximum key sharing (Adjacent nodes share a common key which is pre 
assigned before deployment) between neighboring nodes in a network 
2. The probability that key sharing between neighboring nodes in the network is 
maximized as we use the fusion between Bloom’s scheme [10] and location based 
authentication [7]. One of the main reason for increase in probability that we use 
the same information from which the bloom’s scheme generates symmetric matrix 
D which is later used for key  
3. Each satellite has enough buffers to hold and re-transmit information. 
4. Each satellite has very good processing capability. 
5. At least one satellite has direct contact with the Earth station. 
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3.2.2 ASSUMPTIONS  
 
1.  All the computations are handled by the ground station, so complexity of initial set 
up is not considered. Once the network is set up, the individual nodes can 
compute the keys from key sharing space which can be easily handled by a node 
in network. 
2. The input is a single tree from the root nodes to the destination nodes. 
 
3.2.3 KEY TERMS: 
 
1. Root satellites: The satellites that are directly connected to the ground stations 
2. Ground Station: These are half duplex nodes that are equipped with directional 
antennas and are fixed. Also, they have more resources compared to satellites and 
are assumed to be homogenous in nature. 
3. Mobile Satellites: Satellites rotate according to orbital kinematics and hence their 
motion can be pre-determined and the root satellites keep changing with time. 
4. Key Graph: The graph G (V, E), where V is the set of vertices, and E the set of 
edges of G, each element (vertex or edge) represents the node or link in the 
network.  
5. Security graph: This graph is generated by using blooms scheme [10]. A typical 
network is represented as graph G (V, E). Node set V represents all the routers. E 
is the set of physical links, i.e. E = (u, v) | u, v € V, u and v are connected by a 
physical link. Physical link represents nodes that share a common key. 
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6. Base Topology graph: This graph is generated using Location based Algorithm 
[7], considers the shortest path from root node to the terminal node. We denote 
the Base topology graph as GL (VL, EL). VL is the set of nodes. VL C V and some 
nodes in V may not have been pre-deployed with an ID (satellites which may be 
deployed before location based ID scheme was implemented). EL represents the 
set of sessions, i.e., EL = (u, v)|u, v € VL, u and v share an common key and  
corresponds to path Puv (Path taken along the nodes to reach the destination) 
7. Network Graph: Combination of Security and Base topology graph. 
8. Node:  Each Satellite is considered as a Node. A Node is given a unique Id and 
Secret Key. Nodes also share a common key.  
9. Seed: A term given for a secret quantity shared between nodes. E.g., Key. 
10. Node degree: The degree of a node u, denoted as d(u) is the number of neighbors 
of a node u, i.e., the number of links.  
 
3.3 INTEGRATING BLOOM’S [10] AND LOCATION BASED ALGORITHMS [7]  
3.3.1 PREDEPLOYMENT PHASE: 
 
Construct a matrix of size (λ +1) x N over a finite field GF (q) where N is the size of the 
network and q>N. This matrix G is public information and may be shared by different 
systems; even adversaries are assumed to know G. Node A is assigned a matrix GA where 
GA has the public information of Node A  
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During the key generation phase the base station generates random symmetric secret 
matrices D1 …Dw of size (λ + 1) x (λ +1) over GF(q). Node A is assigned a secret matrix 
DA.  
 
Matrix XA is product of matrix DA and matrix GA.XA is symmetric hence it holds the 
below property  
X.G = (D.G)T .G = GT . DT .G = GT .D.G = (X.G)T. 
 
Each node carries a random master key k, {M}k means encrypting message M with key k 
bound to both its ID and geographic location. H is the hash function mapping string to 
non zero elements. h is a hash function mapping arbitrary inputs to fixed length outputs. 
E.g., when a message of any length < 264 bits is the input, the h function produces a 160-
bit output this type of process is called a message digest. 
 
ê is a pairing map E.g., Let G1 and G2 be two groups of order q for some large prime q 
then ê : G1 X G1  G2 is bilinear if ê (aP,bQ) = ê(P,Q)ab for all (P,Q) Є G1 and all (a, b) 
Є Z   . 
 
AFTER DEPLOYMENT 
 
STEP 1: Node A broadcasts an authentication request including its ID IDA, location    
lA and a random nonce nA. 
q
*
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STEP 2: Node B upon receiving request from Node A checks whether Node A is 
within its Euclidean distance ||lA – lB|| ≤ R.  
STEP 3: If Node A is not within Euclidean distance of Node B, it ignores the request. 
Otherwise B calculates a shared key KB,A = ê (LKB, H(IDA || lA). it then 
unicasts a reply to Node A including its ID and location, a random nonce nB 
and MIC computed HKB, A (nA, || nB ||1). 
STEP 4:Upon receiving the request, node A also first checks if the inequality ||lA – lB|| 
≤ R holds if so it proceeds to derive a shared key as KAB =ê (LKA, H (IDB || 
lB)) whereby to recompute MIC HKA, B (nA, || nB ||2). 
STEP 5: The above steps are valid if and only if both A and B has a correct LBK, 
KAB is equal to KBA which is derived from following equation. 
  KAB = ê( LKA, H (IDB || lB)) 
          = ê( kH(IDA || lA), H(IDB || lB)) 
          = ê( H(IDA || lA), kH(IDB || lB)) 
                  = ê( kH(IDB || lB), H(IDA || lA)) 
                = ê( LKB, H (IDA || lA)) 
          = KBA 
STEP 6: If the result of MIC computed by Node A is equal to Node B, they both 
become authenticate neighbors.
 
 
STEP 7: Assuming Node A and Node B are neighbors and have exchanged the keys.  
Node A regenerates the matrices GB and DAB, Node B regenerates matrix GA 
and DBA, where GA and GB is the public information and DAB and DBA are 
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the secret information exchanged between node A and node B.  XA and XB 
are again calculated using new values of G. 
 XAB = (DAB. GA)T  
 XBA = (DBA. GB)T   
STEP 8: A pair wise key between nodes A and B are computed as follows:  
 When nodes A and B want to establish a pair wise key, they exchange their 
columns of GA or GB after the relation KAB and KBA computed using the 
private rows of XAB or XBA. 
For node A 
XAB.GB = (DAB.GA)T. GB = GAT. DABT. GB = GAT. (GB. DBA) = GAT. XBA = 
(GA. XBA)T= GA. XBA  
 For node B 
XBA.GA = (DBA.GB)T. GA = GBT. DBAT. GA = GBT. (GA. DAB) = GBT. XAB = 
(GB. XAB)T=GB. XAB 
Now in order to establish a secured communication between node A and 
node B the pair wise key generated by node A should be equal to the pair 
wise key generated by node B.  
STEP 9: A secured and reliable network is established between Node A and Node B. 
 
EXAMPLE SCENARIOS: 
SCENARIO I: 
 
Nodes A and B are within the transmission range. 
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STEP 1: Node A broadcasts an authentication request including its ID IDA, location    
lA and a random nonce nA. 
STEP 2: Node B upon receiving request from Node A checks whether Node A is 
within its Euclidean distance ||lA – lB|| ≤ R.  
STEP 3: Node B calculates a shared key KB,A = ê (LKB, H(IDA || lA). it then unicasts a 
reply to Node A including its ID and location, a random nonce nB and MIC 
computed HKB, A (nA, || nB ||1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Various Scenarios of Node placement. 
 
STEP 4:Upon receiving the request, node A also first checks if the inequality ||lA – lB|| 
≤ R holds if so it proceeds to derive a shared key as KAB =ê (LKA, H (IDB || 
lB)) whereby to recompute MIC HKA, B (nA, || nB ||2). 
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STEP 5: The above steps are valid if and only if both A and B has a correct Location 
based key, KAB is equal to KBA. 
 STEP 6: If the result of MIC computed by Node A is equal to Node B, they both 
become authenticate neighbors.
 
 
STEP 7: Assuming Node A and Node B are neighbors and have exchanged the keys.  
Node A regenerates the matrix GB, and Node B regenerates matrix GA. XA 
and XB is again calculated use new value of G. 
 XAB = (DAB. GA)T . 
 XBA = (DBA. GB)T .  
STEP 8: A pair wise key between nodes A and B are computed. If the key generated 
by A is equal to the key generated by Node B then a Pair wise key between 
Node A and B is established.  
STEP 9: A secured and reliable network is established between Node A and Node B. 
 
SCENARIO II 
 
Node B is outside transmission range r0 of Node A, Node B is not malicious and also 
Node B is not authenticated by Node A.  
  
STEP 1: Node A broadcasts an authentication request including its ID IDA, location    
lA and a random nonce nA. 
STEP 2: Node B upon receiving request from Node A checks whether Node A is 
within its Euclidean distance ||lA – lB|| ≤ R.  
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   STEP 3: Node A is not within the transmission range of B. So Node B just ignores the 
        authentication request of Node A. 
 
SCENARIO III: 
 
Node A is within the transmission range of Node B, but Node B is malicious, Node A 
authenticates Node B, but pairwise key not generated. 
STEP 1: Node A broadcasts an authentication request including its ID IDA, location    
lA and a random nonce nA. 
STEP 2: Node B upon receiving request from Node A checks whether Node A is 
within its Euclidean distance ||lA – lB|| ≤ R.  
STEP 3: Node B calculates a shared key KB,A = ê (LKB, H(IDA || lA). it then unicasts a 
reply to Node A including its ID and location, a random nonce nB and MIC 
computed HKB, A (nA, || nB ||1). 
STEP 4:Upon receiving the request, node A also first checks if the inequality ||lA – lB|| 
≤ R holds if so it proceeds to derive a shared key as KAB =ê (LKA, H (IDB || 
lB)) whereby to recompute MIC HKA, B (nA, || nB ||2). 
STEP 5: The above steps are valid if and only if both A and B has a correct Location 
based key, KAB is equal to KBA. 
STEP 6: If the result of MIC computed by Node A is equal to Node B, they both 
become authenticate neighbors.
 
 
STEP 7: Assuming Node A and Node B are neighbors and have exchanged the keys.  
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Node A regenerates the matrix GB, and Node B regenerates matrix GA. XA 
and XB is again calculated use new value of G. 
 XA = (DAB. GA) T   
 XB = (DBA. GB) T   
STEP 8: The algorithm checks whether the pairwise key generated by node A is equal 
to the one generated by Node B. In order to confirm there is no malicious 
Node between them.  If the matrix generated by Node A is not equal to 
matrix generated by node B there is no pairwise key establishment between 
Node A and Node B. The malicious node will not be able to calculate its 
pairwise key as it will not have sufficient information to do the same. 
STEP 9: Connection is terminated between nodes A and B considering there is a 
malicious node between them. 
 
NOTE: 
Information exchanged between Nodes consists of their IDs, Location, a random nonce 
which is a unique number generated only once for a particular node and a secret master 
key. Using this information each node tries to communicate with the other node to check 
whether they are an authenticate neighbor 
3.3.2 SECURITY ANALYSIS: 
 
To achieve security in wireless networks it is important to encrypt and authenticate 
messages send between nodes. Keys which are used for performing encryption and 
authentication must be agreed upon by the communicating nodes.  
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In the combined scheme first we propose location based keys, in which each node holds a 
private key bound to both its ID and location. It helps to achieve the desirable goal of 
localizing the impact of compromise nodes to their vicinity as they check whether the 
nodes are within its range which is not present in any others previous scheme making it 
much more secured and reliable. The integrated scheme has strong resilience again node 
compromise. It guarantee’s that as long as there are not more then λ compromised nodes 
holding a pairwise key which shares the same cell or matrix, adversaries are unable to 
forge data reports to originate from that particular matrix or cell and escape the filtering 
by enroute intermiate nodes and the sink.   
 
Adversaries might launch denial of service attacks by trapping legitimate nodes into 
endless verification of data reports The links in the key sharing graph is secured using a 
pairwise key computed from the common key space shared by the two nodes. In key 
sharing setup stage, two neighboring nodes can use the established secure links to agree 
upon anther random key to secure their communication. Thus the combined scheme is 
more reliable and secure compared to any other previous scheme.  
 
3.4 SIMULATION MODEL: 
 
The main Objective of this model is to derive a k connected network given its range, 
number of nodes and its work space width. Our Simulation model consists of rectangular 
work space where nodes are placed using a random uniform generator. The nodes are 
placed one after the other in the work space and the transmission range of the satellite are 
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initialized before the nodes are placed, the transmission range of the earth station is also 
initialized before being placed on the work space. The earth stations or ground stations 
are placed on the lower part of the work space. The earth stations are assumed to be 
always interconnected.  The earth stations (ground stations) are frequently in contact with 
the nodes which are within its transmission range.  
 
Once the nodes are placed in the work space, we identify the source and destination 
nodes between which we need to transmit information. The connectivity algorithm is 
based on checking whether a directed path exists between the source and destination 
nodes as well as between all the other nodes in the workspace.   
 
Now, we adopt graphs as a way of identifying the directed paths.  In order to do this, we 
identify the nodes and their interconnections based on the range of the nodes.  If the 
distance between two nodes is within the distance range of the nodes then we consider 
that the nodes are directly connected otherwise we state that the nodes are not directly 
connected.  Using this premise, we construct a distance matrix (as illustrated in table 2) in 
which we state the distance between all the nodes in the workspace.  For simplicity and 
computation purposes, if two nodes are not directly connected then we use the value -1 in 
the distance matrix to indicate that the nodes are not directly connected.   
 
The distance matrix D is created across N x N nodes, that is present in the workspace.  
From this matrix we construct a binary matrix A, as shown in Table 3, by taking all the 
elements of the distance matrix D, and apply the transformation that if a cell of D has a 
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positive value then the corresponding cell of the binary matrix A is assigned a value 1. 
For all other cells, the value 0 is assigned. In linear algebra, the identity matrix or unit 
matrix of size N is the N-by-N square matrix with ones on the main diagonal and zeros 
elsewhere. It is denoted by I, or simply by I. 
 
The important property of Identity Matrix I, for any matrix B is that,  
 
B x I = B   and   I x B = B 
 
From the binary matrix A, we proceed to create the interaction matrix Aj.  The interaction 
matrix Aj is defined by the matrix expression Aj = A + I, where A is the binary matrix 
obtained from the distance matrix D and I is the identity matrix corresponding to the 
binary matrix A as shown in Table 4.  In order to establish connectivity between nodes, 
we try to check if a node x is reachable from node y.  This is possible if a directed walk 
from y to x is possible where walking a graph means traversing an alternating sequence 
of nodes that are directly connected.   
 
The reachability matrix of the graph Aj is an N × N matrix R where rij, the entry on the i-
th row and j-th column, is defined by 
rij = 1 if j is reachable from i 
rij = 0 if j is not reachable from i   
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Satellites X coordinate Y coordinate Range 
S1 58905.8 71706.2 24000 
S2 94842.9 115704 24000 
S3 71794.2 131056 24000 
S4 23372.7 119156 24000 
S5 105735 89126.7 24000 
S6 46585.4 126096 24000 
S7 24388.7 7044.21 24000 
S8 41553.3 127248 24000 
S9 6720.21 8776.27 24000 
S10 78846.4 90930.8 24000 
Table 1: Sample Data 
 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
S1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 20437.9 
S2 5519.51 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 16915.1 -1 
S3 -1 10555.7 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
S4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 5222.74 -1 -1 -1 
S5 -1 18590.8 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
S6 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
S7 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
S8 -1 23746.3 -1 -1 23855.2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
S9 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 9089.5 
S10 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 21693.6 -1 
Table 2: Distance Matrix 
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 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
S1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
S2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
S3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
S5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S8 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
S10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Table 3: Binary Matrix 
 
 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
S1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
S2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
S3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S4 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
S5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
S6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
S7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
S8 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
S9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
S10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Table 4: Interaction Matrix 
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A reachability matrix R is a binary matrix with a reflexive and transitive property, i.e., R 
+ I = R and R2 = R, where I is the identity matrix. A skeleton matrix S for a reachability 
matrix R satisfies the inequality SK -2 ≠ SK – 1 and SK = R.  Using this understanding, we 
try to arrive at the reachability matrix R for our interaction matrix Aj which serves as the 
skeleton matrix S.  Therefore if we try to establish the equality  
Aj N = Aj N + 1 
Then the resultant matrix Aj N will be the reachability matrix R.  From the definition of 
reachability between two nodes as given in equation 3.1, we know that if a particular cell 
has a value 1 then the corresponding column node is reachable from the node at the 
corresponding row.  It follows that to establish connectivity across all nodes all the 
elements of the reachability matrix should be 1. The algorithm tests this state of the 
reachability matrix to establish connectivity for the simulation.   
The model is then run for a number of times to test for connectivity of the nodes.  Each 
run will generate a new set of location data for the nodes and the earth stations.   Satellite 
range (min and max) specifies the actual distance of transmission of the signal from the 
node or rather its signal strength in distance.  This means that any satellite/station that lies 
within that range can communicate with this satellite. Transmission of data from one 
satellite to the other satellite is based on the range of the other satellite.   
Satellite density is the number of satellites within a given area.  E.g., if total satellites are 
100 in a workspace of 1000 x 1000 then for a density area of 100 x 100, we can have 
probably 2 satellites at the maximum or 0/1 at the minimum. 
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3.5 PROBABILISTIC MODEL: 
 
The main objective of this probabilistic model is to calculate the probability that two 
nodes are within range r0 and also share a common key between them.  
 
3.5.1 BASE TOPOLOGY MODEL: 
 
This Probabilistic model derives a probabilistic expression that calculates probability of 
nodes which lies within an area A given its range r0, nodes N, and size of the work area.. 
 
Figure 2:  Base Topology Model 
STEP 1: Consider p1, p2 …pn Є 2 are the points randomly uniformly placed in an 
interval [0,w]  and [h,0] on a two dimensional plane. 
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STEP 2: Connect any two points which are within transmission range r0 
STEP 3: Let pi = (xi, yi) where xi and yi are the random variables whose values are in 
the Disc A. where A is the range of pi. Let λ denote the probability of a point 
in A.  
Let K denote number of nodes inside the Disc A. ρ is the node density i.e., 
number of nodes per square area ρ = N/(w.h) 
 P(pi Є A) = A∫∫ ρ dA = ρ|A| 
|A| = Πr2 
λ = Πr2 /(w. h) 
STEP 4: Let K denote number of points that are within the disc A. Probability that 
exactly k points are in disc A. 
P (K=k) = 





k
N
λk (1- λ) N - k 
Where 





k
N
 = N!/((N – k)!k!), Probability to have k points within A is λk 
Probability to have k points outside Disc A is λN-k. N is the total number of 
points. 
STEP 5: Probability of finding atleast L points in disc A 
P (K ≥ L) = P(K = l) + P(K=l +1 ) +… 
All the above are disjoint  
So P (K≥L) = 1 – (P(K = 0) + (P (K=1) +…P(K=L-1)) 
        = 1 – ((λ0 (1 – λ)N-0 + (λ1 (1 – λ)N-1)…  ) 
    = 1 - ∑
−
=
1
0
N
k
(λk (1 – λ)N-k ) 
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3.5.2 KEY SHARING MODEL [10]: 
                
The key sharing probabilistic model allows any pair of nodes in a network to share a pair 
wise secret key as long as no more then λ nodes is compromised.  
 
Let (λ + 1) x N be a matrix over a finite field GF(q), where N is the size of the network 
and q > N. Matrix G is a public information and is shared by all nodes in the network . 
During key generation phase the base station creates a random (λ + 1) x (λ + 1) 
symmetric matrix D over GH(q) and computes an N x (λ + 1) matrix X = (D.G)T  where 
(D.G)T is the transpose of D.G. Matrix D must be kept secret and should not be disclosed 
to others.  
 
Figure 3:  Key Sharing Model [10] 
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Let K = X.G and Kij = Kji where Kij is the element in the ith row and jth column of K as we 
use Kij or Kji are the pairwise key between node i and node j. For k = 1,2,...N 
- store the kth row of matrix X at node k  
- store the kth column of matrix G and node k 
When nodes i and j need to communicate they exchange their columns of G and the 
compute Kij or Kji. Using private rows of X. as G is public information.  
 
During the Key generation phase the base station generates random symmetric matrices. 
Consider D1, D2 …Dn be the secret matrices generated by the base station. 
For each node i Є {1,2,…N} the base station chooses a random index di Є {1,2,…m} and 
assigns the matrix Ddi. 
P(di = j) = 1/m where j Є {1,2,…m} 
Now fix any two nodes i1, i2 Є {1, 2,…N} 
 
Probability that a node Ddi1 is randomly assigned a key j is given by 1/m and probability 
that a node Ddi2 is randomly assigned a key j is given by 1/m.Probability that a node Di1 
and Di2 is assigned a key j is given by  
    Ddi1 = j = Ddi2 = 1/m2 for any fixed key j. 
Probability that the nodes Ddi1 and Ddi2 are assigned any random key in j is given by 
   
   = 1/m 
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3.5.3 COMBINED MODEL: 
 
The combined probabilistic model uses the results obtained from base topology model 
and security model. Probabilistic model analyzes the probability that nodes if within 
range share a common key. 
 
Place a point Pi1 within an area A, where A represents the exact range of Pi. Place a point 
Pj within the same area A which means that Pi and Pj are within transmission range of 
each other. Probability that node Pi and Pj are within an area A is given by λ and 
probability that the node Pi share a common key j with node Pj is (1/m).  
 
The probability that node Pi and node Pj are within range and share a common key is 
given by λ/m. 
 
 Let K denote numbers of nodes that are within the disc A. Probability to have k points 
within A is λk. Probability that k points share anyone of the keys in j is given by (1/m).  
 
Probability that exactly k points are in disc A (within range) and share a common key is 
given by λk/m. 
 
The combined model considers only nodes that are within range and share a common 
key. We will not consider any nodes that are outside the range. 
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3.6 NETWORK MODEL: 
 
The main objective of network model is to determine a connected and secure path 
between nodes. This model intersects two different graphs Base topology graph which 
gives a reliable path and security graph which gives a secured path to obtain a network 
graph which is both connected and secure.  
3.6.1 BASE TOPOLOGY GRAPH [7]:  
 
The graph generated below uses Location based Algorithm [7] which considers the 
distance from root node to the terminal node. 
Let P1, P2 …Pk be the points in  and for some range R > 0.  A graph is derived using 
the above input variable as follows, a graph GL (VL, EL) is drawn where VL  = {1, 2…k} 
and EL = {{ i, j}| || Pi – Pj|| ≤ R} where || Pi – Pj|| = Sqrt ((Xi – Xj )2 + (Yi – Yj)2) where Pi 
=(Xi,Yi).
 
Figure 4: Base Topology Graph 
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3.6.2 SECURITY GRAPH [10] : 
  
Security graph (Blooms Scheme) considers key sharing algorithm. Nodes which share a 
common key are connected. 
 
 Let K be finite set and K1, K2 …Kk be subsets of K i.e., Ki C K. A graph is derived using 
the above input variables as follows, a graph GP (VP, EP), where VP = {1… k} and EP = 
{{i,j} | Ki ∩ Kj ≠ Ø}. The output graph connects nodes which share a common key 
between them.  
 
Figure 5: Security Graph  
Above diagram depicts a graph where 1,2,..N are the nodes and k = {1,2,...m} are the 
keys shared between the nodes. 
 
EXAMPLE: 
K1 is the key shared between nodes 2 and 3 
K2 is the key shared between nodes 3 and 4 
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3.6.3 NETWORK GRAPH 
 
Network graph is derived by combining Bloom’s [10] and Location Based Algorithm’s 
[7]. Bloom’s scheme (Security graph) GP models communication restricted by key 
sharing such that pair of nodes are adjacent to GP if and only if they are share a pairwise 
key between them. The Location based graph (Base topology graph) GL models logical 
relationships resulting from the given relation R such that pair of nodes adjacent to GL if 
and only if the relation R is true. The Network graph GN is given by the edge wise 
intersection of GP and GL.  
Let (VL, EL) and (VP, EP) be two graphs derived from Base topology and Security graph 
respectively. Intersection of these two graphs GN = (VL, EL) ∩ (VP, EP) given by 
       VN = (VL ∩ VP) and EN = (EL ∩ EP)  
The resulting Network graph has the property that two nodes can be connected only if 
they are within a range and share a common key. 
 
Figure 6: Network Graph
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EXAMPLES: 
 
SCENARIO I: 
BASE TOPOLOGY GRAPH: 
STEP 1: Place points randomly uniformly on the work space.  
STEP 2: Connect any two points which are within the range r0.  
 
SECURITY GRAPH: 
STEP 3: Place points randomly uniformly on the work space. 
STEP 4: Connect any two points which share a common key. 
 
Figure 7: Scenario I 
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NETWORK GRAPH: 
STEP 5: The Edge wise intersection of base topology graph and security graph gives 
network graph. Scenario I does not have any common links between base 
topology graph and security graph. There are neither common links nor they 
share a common key between the two graphs. Network graph cannot be drawn 
using the above two graphs. 
 
SCENARIO II 
 
Figure 8: Scenario II 
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BASE TOPOLOGY GRAPH: 
STEP 1: Place points randomly uniformly on the work space.  
STEP 2: Connect any two points which are within the range r0.  
 
SECURITY GRAPH: 
STEP 3: Place points randomly uniformly on the work space. 
STEP 4: Connect any two points which share a common key. 
 
NETWORK GRAPH: 
STEP 5: The Edge wise intersection of base topology graph and security graph gives 
network graph. In Scenario II Base topology graph and Security graph share 
common vertices and they have a path between source to destination. The 
resulting Network graph has the property that two nodes can be connected only 
if they are within a range and share a common key. 
 
SCENARIO III: 
BASE TOPOLOGY GRAPH: 
STEP 1: Place points randomly uniformly on the work space.  
STEP 2: Connect any two points which are within the range r0.  
 
SECURITY GRAPH: 
STEP 3: Place points randomly uniformly on the work space. 
STEP 4: Connect any two points which share a common key. 
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NETWORK GRAPH: 
STEP 5: The Edge wise intersection of base topology graph and security graph gives 
network graph. In scenario III Base topology graph and Security graph do have 
common vertices between them. But they do not have path, there are broken 
links between them. Network graph obtained is of no use as there is no path 
between each node to each other node.   
 
 
Figure 9: Scenario III 
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SECURITY ANALYSIS: 
 
Network graph is derived from the edgewise intersection of based topology graph and 
security graph. Network graph is more secure as it has the properties of both base 
topology graph as well as security graph.  
 
The links in the key sharing graph is secured using a pairwise key computed from the 
common key space shared by the two nodes. In key sharing setup stage, two neighboring 
nodes can use the established secure links to agree upon another random key generated 
using location based to secure their communication. Thus the combined network graph is 
more reliable and secure compared to any other previous scheme.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SIMULATION 
The main objective of this simulation model is to calculate the probability of success to 
achieve a k connected network given range r0, number of nodes and work space. 
 
A simulation program is designed as explained in section 3.4 in Visual C++. In our 
simulator a uniform random generator chooses X and Y coordinates of nodes on any 
given system area. For a given random range r0, the links between the nodes are created 
and the min node density of the resulting network is determined along with the 
probability of  connectivity of node with each other node.  
The simulation model has following four input parameters 
1) Satellite density 
2) Earth station density 
3) Range of each satellite (min – max) 
4) Work area width and work area height 
 
Simulations are carried out by keeping one or two of the above parameters constant and 
varying the rest of the parameters.  
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4.1 NO WORK SPACE HEIGHT: 
 
Simulation results for 300 experiments with 200 nodes and the number of earth stations 
range from 5 to 20 and range r0 ranging 50 to 1000 uniformly distributed on a work 
space area (70000 X 0).  
 
RESULT: 
 
By varying the ratio of work space, the satellites and earth stations are placed on the same 
vertical line along x axis as there is no value for y axis. The satellites almost connected if 
the range r0>=1000 and number of earth stations are more then 20. The results are taken 
for r0<1000. If the range r0 <=100 and the number of earth stations < 5 the probability of 
connectedness is almost 0. Now the probability of connectedness increases as the range is 
increased.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: No Work Space Height 
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4.2 VARYING WORK SPACE HEIGHT AND WIDTH: 
 
MINIMUM HEIGHT MAXIMUM WIDTH: 
 
 
Simulation results for 300 experiments with 200 nodes by varying both range as well as 
number of earth stations distributed on work space area (70000 X 10000).  
 
RESULT: 
By varying the work space the probability of connectedness of the nodes varies as most 
of nodes are in contact with some earth station if the number of earth stations are more 
then 20 and range r0>7000. Probability of success of k connected node is almost 0 if the 
range is less then 1000 and number of earth stations are less then 5.  
 
 
Figure 11: Minimum height Maximum width 
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MINIMUM WIDTH MAXIMUM HEIGHT: 
 
Simulation results for 300 experiments with 200 nodes by varying both range as well as 
number of earth stations distributed on work space area (10000 X 70000).  
 
RESULT: 
 
By varying the work space the probability of connectedness of the nodes varies as the 
number of satellites in contact with the earth station increases. Probability of success of k 
connected node is almost 0 if the range is less then 1000 and almost 1 if the range is more 
then 10000 and number of earth stations are greater then 20. 
 
 
Figure 12: Minimum Width Maximum Height 
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4.3 VARYING WORK SPACE WIDTH AND HEIGHT WITH NO EARTH 
STATIONS: 
 
Simulation results for 300 experiments with 200 nodes and number of earth stations is 
zero uniformly distributed on work space area (10000 X 70000) and work space area 
(70000 X 10000)  
 
RESULT: 
 
By varying the work space the probability of connectedness of the nodes remains almost 
the same. As there are no earth stations the probability of connectivity between nodes 
placed along minimum height and maximum width will remain almost same for nodes 
placed along maximum height and minimum width.  
 
 
Figure 13: No Earth Stations 
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4.4 NO WORK SPACE WIDTH: 
 
Simulation results for 300 experiments with 200 nodes uniformly distributed on work 
space area (0 X 70000). The satellites and are randomly placed along the width of the 
work space area as the height of the work space area is zero. 
 
RESULT: 
 
By varying the ratio of work space the satellites and earth stations are placed on the same 
horizontal line along y axis as x axis = 0. The satellites are at most connected if the range 
r0>1000. The results are taken for r0>1000. If the range of r0 ≤1000 the probability of 
connectedness is almost 0. Now the probability of connectedness increases as the range is 
increased.  
 
 
Figure 14: No Work Space Width 
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4.5 K CONNECTIVITY TEST: 
TEST I: 
 
Simulation results for 300 experiments with 200 nodes uniformly distributed on work 
space Area (70000 X 70000) with range varying from 500 - 2500 checking k 
connectedness by removing nodes (k≤1 to k=3).  
 
RESULT: 
 
The Probability of being k-connected changes fast from 0 to 1 as r0 increases. Simulation 
is run by removing one node at a time; the results may vary as the number of nodes that is 
being removed varies. The curves below show a significant difference for probabilities 
below 96%. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: K connectivity test I 
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TEST II: 
 
Simulation results for 300 experiments with 200 nodes uniformly distributed on work 
space Area (70000X 70000) m2 with range r0 kept constant. 
 
RESULTS: 
 
A network having a constant range r0 with n ≤ 25 nodes is almost surely disconnected and 
a network with n ≥ 100 has very high probability to have a fully connected network. As 
the range increases the probability of connectivity between the nodes also increases even 
with less number of nodes. If the number of nodes n = 200 and range r0 = 10000 an 
almost surely connected network is obtained. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: K connected test II 
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4.6 CONNECTIVITY: 
 
In our thesis, through simulation, we have examined Penrose's theorem on k-connectivity 
for a geometric random graph. Penrose's theorem [15] states that considering a bounded 
region in space of d dimensions, with d >= 2, and n uniformly randomly distributed 
points in it. If P denotes the probability that for a minimum r > 0, a graph created by 
connecting all points which are r distance apart is k connected, then as n  infinity, P  
1.  
  
Through extensive simulation, for a homogeneous distribution of points, we have 
examined that in a two dimensional bounded region for a constant distance r and n <= 25, 
the probability P that the nodes are k-connected  0 and for n >= 200, the probability P 
that the nodes are k-connected  1.  We have also examined that as this distance r 
increases, the probability P that the nodes are k-connected  1 at lesser values of n (n = 
100).   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
  
In this paper we have combined two schemes first is location based algorithm which 
binds private keys of individual nodes to both their IDs and concrete geographic locations 
and secondly Bloom’s scheme which shares a pairwise key between two nodes if and 
only if they are authenticate neighbors and share a common key. Our combined scheme 
has number of appealing properties. First our scheme is scalable and flexible, and nodes 
do not need to be deployed at the same time, they can be added after initial deployment, 
and still be able to establish secret keys with existing nodes. Compared to previous 
predistribution schemes, our scheme is substantially more resilient against node capture. 
 
 We have proposed few other models which enables the connectivity of a network with 
random node distribution and also modeled a network as geometric random graph and 
derived an probabilistic expression that calculates the probability that if two nodes  
within range share a common key, given its transmission range r0, density ρ and number 
of nodes in the work space. Also if maximum range r0 of the nodes are given, we can 
find out how many nodes are required to cover a certain area with a k-connected network. 
Simulations are run for each scenario by modifying input parameters. Results obtained by 
simulations can be used by researchers and developers who want to further 
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run simulations on these satellite networks. Simulations results can also be implemented 
in real time satellite systems and also in adhoc networks. Finally the results of this paper 
can be used to any kind  of  multihop  network.
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